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Abstract
We extend the analysis of a riskless choice experiment reported recently by Hochman et al.
(2014). Participants select from among sets of standard playing cards valued by a simple for-
mula. In some sessions, participants are given a prepayment associated with some of the cards,
which need not be the earnings-maximizing ones. Hochman et al. find that participants choose
an earnings-maximizing card less frequently when another card is prepaid. We replicate this
result under the original instructions, but not with instructions which explain the payment
process more explicitly. Participants who state they do not consider themselves good at mathe-
matics make earnings-maximizing choices much less frequently overall, but those who express
self-confidence in mathematics drive the treatment effect. The results suggest that even when
comparisons among choices require only simple quantitative reasoning steps, market design-
ers and regulators may need to pay close attention to how the terms of offers are expressed,
explained, and implemented.
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1 Introduction
A stylized fact of behavioral economics is that individuals dislike losses more than they like equiv-
alent gains. The endowment effect (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990), status quo bias
(e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991), and the sunk cost fallacy (e.g. Thaler, 1999) are well-established
behavioral regularities which can be attributed to loss aversion. Some studies of these effects
involve cross-modal comparisons involving different types of goods or assets. For example, Kah-
neman et al. (1990) observed that participants were reluctant to sell a mug given to them by the
experimenter at the beginning of the experiment. Evidence is mixed on whether the endowment
effect extends to money, as opposed to other goods.1 Becker et al. (1974) found that participants
in a non-incentivized experiment systematically treated outlay costs differently from opportunity
costs. However, Kahneman et al. did not find evidence of the effect when they used tokens instead
of mugs.
Hochman et al. (2014) (henceforth HAA) report an experiment in which participants perform
a series of choice tasks with no objective risk. In each task, participants are presented with a
set of four standard playing cards, from which they must choose one. To each card is attached
a monetary value, which depends on both the suit and the rank of the card. In one treatment,
participants receive an advance payment, which corresponds to a specific pattern of choices across
five out of seven decision tasks. Some of these choices are not the optimal (earnings-maximizing)
ones for their corresponding task. In a control treatment, participants receive no advance payment.
They find that participants who receive prepayment are more likely to carry out the pre-paid choice
even when it is not earnings-maximizing, while participants who do not receive prepayment are
relatively more likely to make the earnings-maximizing choice. As the choice task involves no
objective risk, HAA interpret this result as supporting loss aversion in money in a very strong
form, and label this the “prepayment effect.”
Such a strong result could have significant implications for the choice architectures firms use
to interact with employees, contractors, and consumers. HAA give an example in which a firm
pre-pays its downstream agents their commissions for selling their product, with the requirement
that those agents pay back commissions should they fall short of their target; the prepayment effect
would suggest these agents are more likely to stick with selling the firm’s product (as opposed to
a rival’s) when they are paid in advance. The phenomenon of sticking to an apparently suboptimal
decision has a parallel in consumer decision-making, in which it is argued that consumers fail to
switch suppliers in markets such as banking, energy, and telecommunications, even though better
plans are on offer. (Wilson and Waddams-Price, 2010; Lunn, 2011; Grubb, 2015; Grubb and
Osborne, 2015; Sitzia et al., 2015)
1For a lengthier discussion see Hochman et al. (2014).
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In those markets, complexity has been cited as one driver of stickiness in both empirical and
laboratory studies. (Larrick and Soll, 2008; Allcott, 2011; Kalayci and Potters, 2011; Sitzia and
Zizzo, 2011; Grubb and Osborne, 2015) HAA’s card-choice task has only one complicating feature:
the rule to calculate the value of a card depends on its suit. Spades are worth USD 0.25 times the
rank of the card, while all other suits are worth USD 0.10 times the rank of the card. The values
of the cards are thus not determined by a single, common standard (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2012;
Piccione and Spiegler, 2012) but depend on two dimensions, suit and rank. In two of the three
conditions reported by HAA, participants are provided with the monetary value of the cards, either
instead of or in addition to the card’s suit and rank. In those conditions, in which the values of the
cards have been in effect reduced to a common standard, HAA do not observe a prepayment effect.
HAA’s experiment demonstrates that the introduction of a minimally non-common standard can
be enough to affect decision-making significantly.
In this paper, we take a closer look at HAA’s card-choice task to understand more completely
the underpinnings of the prepayment effect. In Section 2, we conduct an analysis of the exper-
imental design, focusing on their “distant representation” treatment in which values of cards are
not presented using a common standard. Based on previous literature, we identify a number of
candidate factors which might affect a participant’s propensity to choose a card which does not
maximize their earnings. These include features of the choice architecture – specifically, the con-
tent and structure of the experimental instructions – as well as demographic factors including the
participant’s prior experience in experiments and their self-perception of their ability in mathemat-
ics.
Our results in Section 3 show that behavior in this simple task depends on these factors. We
replicate the prepayment effect reported by HAA using their experimental protocol and instruc-
tions; prepayment can indeed lower the frequency of earnings-maximizing choices. We show there
are significant and substantial differences in the probability of earnings maximization as a function
of individual characteristics. Participants who report they are good at mathematics maximize far
more often overall, except, notably, in the prepayment treatment as implemented by HAA. It is
this group of math-confident participants who account for most of the treatment effect in our data.
We find no significant effect due to experience with economics experiments. We also find that the
prepayment effect largely disappears under rewritten instructions which describe the transactions
that will take place should the participant choose a card other than the one for which prepayment
was made. We conclude in Section 4 by discussing how the results from this simple task, which
turn out to be quite rich and interesting, might inform the applicability of the prepayment effect
beyond the laboratory.
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2 Experimental analysis and design
Our experiment replicates and extends the “distant representation” condition of Experiment 1A in
HAA. There are seven decision tasks. In each task, a participant sees a set of four playing cards,
from which one must be chosen. Each card’s monetary value depends both on its suit and its rank,
where aces are considered to have rank one, and jacks, queens, and kings to have ranks 11, 12, and
13, respectively. There are 5 spades cards in the deck, from ace to five; these cards are worth GBP
0.25 times the card’s rank. The value of a card from any other suit is GBP 0.10 times its rank.
In HAA spades are valued at USD 0.25 per rank and other suits at USD 0.10 per rank; our stakes
were 50 to 60 percent higher than HAA as measured by using the prevailing exchange rate at the
time of the experiment.
The seven sets of cards, which are provided in Appendix A, are presented in the same order
for each participant. In two sets, a spade is the earnings-maximizing card; these are called “high-
spades” trials. In two other sets, a spade is present, but there is some other non-spade card in the
set which is worth strictly more; these are called “low-spades” trials. HAA call the remaining
three sets filler trials: of these, one set has a spade and a non-spade card which are tied as earnings-
maximizing cards, and the remaining two sets do not contain any spade cards. Participants make
their choices for all seven sets of cards without any feedback; a summary screen appears at the end
of the session reporting the seven chosen cards, and calculating the participant’s earnings for the
session.2
The experiments were conducted in the laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and Experi-
mental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Participants were recruited from
the lab’s standard subject pool, which is managed using the hRoot system (Bock et al., 2012).
The choice task was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions took place between
November 2014 and October 2015, and lasted around 20 to 30 minutes, including all instructions
and final payment.
2.1 Baseline and replication
Our first objective is to replicate the existence of the prepayment effect within the subject pool at
our laboratory. We conduct two treatments, Post and Pre+Amt, which replicate the two payment
conditions used by HAA.3 For these treatments, we used instructions which deviated as little as
possible from HAA’s, allowing only for the different currency. Treatment Post is a standard post-
payment setup: participants make all seven choices, then see a summary screen which recaps
2Full instructions and screenshots of the decision interface are available as an online appendix.
3We present treatment names in boldface type, choosing names intended to help recall the purpose of each treat-
ment.
4
the decisions and tabulates their earnings. They are then dismissed one-by-one to the payment
station and receive their payments in private before departing the laboratory. Treatment Pre+Amt
implements HAA’s prepayment treatment. Each participant is given GBP 3.75 in cash at their
station prior to making their choices. Participants are told this amount is the sum value of the five
spades cards which will appear among the seven sets (hence the “Amount” in the treatment’s label).
After all seven choices are made, the summary screen appears; this screen tabulates separately the
values of the cards chosen, as well as the value of any spade cards not chosen. Participants are then
dismissed one-by-one to the payment station to settle payments in private. We carefully kept to the
prepayment framing, in that, for any spades not chosen, we took back coins from the participant,
and then gave them different coins for the cards actually chosen; that is, we did not integrate the
two payments into a net payment.4
Hypothesis 1. Participants will choose the earnings-maximizing card more often in Post than
Pre+Amt, replicating the existence of the prepayment effect.
2.2 Influence of the choice environment
HAA attribute the treatment effect they observe between Post and Pre+Amt to the existence of the
prepayment in Pre+Amt. We identify two other ways in which the description of the experimental
task differs between the two treatments. Exploring alternative instructions serves to map out the
robustness of the treatment effect in the lab, but also provides a link to possible applicability in
markets. The description of the experimental task is the parallel of the contract between firm
and downstream sales agents in HAA’s example, or the terms of a tariff in a consumer’s plan for
electricity, gas, or telecommunications.
In Pre+Amt, in order to explain the significance of the GBP 3.75 received in advance of deci-
sions, the instructions included the following language:
We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly ... The
value of the five spades (ace through five) equals a total of three pounds and seventy-
five cents: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p i.e. three
pounds and seventy five pence. We will give you this amount up front.
No parallel language exists in Post; the total value of spades is not pointed out to participants
explicitly. To identify whether the mere mention of the value of spades might call attention to
spades, or otherwise create a reference point, we conduct treatment Post+Amt, in which we retain
postpayment, but include the language mentioning the total value of spades.
4As all decisions were made by this point in the session, this bit of theatre could not affect results; nevertheless we
wanted to be careful to maintain the framing throughout the session.
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Hypothesis 2. Participants will maximize less frequently in Post+Amt than in Post; mentioning
the value of spades will result in fewer maximizing choices.
A second difference between Post and Pre+Amt is the length and complexity of the instruc-
tions. Describing the prepayment protocol necessarily makes instructions longer, as there are more
steps to explain to participants.
To check on the robustness of the prepayment effect to alternate but in-principle equivalent
ways of explaining the mechanism, we replace some of the text from the HAA originals. Specifi-
cally, at the end of their instructions, HAA state,
At the end of the game, if you have not selected all spades, we will pay you for the
cards you have selected, and you will refund us money for the spades you have not
selected.
Our design of alternative phrasing is based on HAA reporting of results from follow-on experi-
ments, which they interpret as indicating that an explicit linkage between amounts of money and
choices of particular cards is important for the prepayment effect to operate. In our treatment
Pre+Amt+Instr, we therefore replace the above sentence with the following text intended to high-
light that linkage:
For each set of four playing cards, there are three possible scenarios:
• There is not a spade among the four cards. Then, at the end of the session, you
will receive a payment for that set equal to the value of the card you select.
• There is a spade among the four cards, but you select a different card. Then,
at the end of the session, you will pay us back from your up front payment an
amount equal to the value of the spade, and you will receive a payment from us
equal to the value of the card you did select.
• There is a spade among the four cards, and you select the spade. Then, because
you have already received payment for that spade card in your up front payment,
you will not pay us back anything for that set, nor will you receive any additional
payment for that set.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of prepayment depends on the instructions; maximization rates will be
higher in Pre+Amt+Instr than Pre+Amt.
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Information on Advance Instructions
total value of spades payment same as HAA
Post No No Yes
Pre+Amt Yes Yes Yes
Post+Amt Yes No No
Pre+Amt+Instr Yes Yes No
Table 1: Summary of experimental treatments.
2.3 Effects of prior experience
We now turn our attention to the characteristics of the decision-makers themselves. Our next
hypothesis concerns the role of experience. The card choice task in HAA is simple. It is also
artificial, in the sense that the rules for determining valuations of the cards are not drawn from
a game or situation that exists “in the wild.” Participants cannot draw on prior experience with
the task or very similar ones, in the way that an economic agent might draw on experience in
understanding the implications of prepayment arrangements for commissions.
The artificiality of the task is a useful feature, in that it allows the construction of a decision
problem with the most minimal amount of complexity arising from the lack of a common stan-
dard.5 While we cannot easily address the role that familiarity with this specific task might play
in the persistence of the prepayment effect, we can ask whether participants who have previous
experience with economic experiments behave differently.
Previous experience might predict behavior for two reasons. First, previous experience may
affect expectations about how lab experiments operate in a generalized sense. Experience has been
shown to have an effect in, for example, public goods games (Conte et al., 2014) and allocation
games (Matthey and Regner, 2013). Some of the effect of experience in games would be due to
more accurate beliefs about the play of others, an aspect that is absent in this individual decision
task. Nevertheless prior experience may be valuable, insofar as participants will have familiarity
with general lab procedures, including how to read and extract relevant information from instruc-
tions. Second, participants with prior experience also have self-selected into coming back to the
laboratory. Abeler and Nosenzo (2014) have studied self-selection into participant pools and report
that interest in monetary rewards appears strongly to drive participation.
Both channels would suggest experienced participants would be more likely to maximize earn-
ings. To explore the possible role of experience with experiments, we conducted a stratified re-
cruiting strategy. We identified very experienced participants as those who had participated at least
10 times previously in experimental sessions, and somewhat less experienced participants as those
5Schram (2005) is a good discussion of the tradeoffs between internal and external validity arising from the artifi-
ciality of laboratory games.
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who had participated no more than 5 times. We recruited approximately equal numbers of partici-
pants from these two subpopulations. Those who had participated 6 to 9 times were not recruited,
to give a more clear distinction between the groups.
Hypothesis 4. Participants with greater experience in experiments will have higher maximization
rates in prepayment treatments.
2.4 Effects of confidence at the specific task
The distant representation condition we focus on in our experiment is one of three conditions in
the full Experiment 1A design of HAA. In their close representation condition, payoffs were rep-
resented not by playing cards, but directly expressed as amounts of money. In the moderate rep-
resentation condition, payoffs were depicted using playing cards, but with a label indicating their
monetary value. HAA find evidence of the prepayment effect only in the distant representation
condition.
The distant representation requires a particular type of operation, mathematical calculation, for
participants to infer the earnings consequences of the options they face. The arithmetic required is
taught at an early age in schools, and can be taken as part of the assumed skills an undergraduate
student at a university would have. Although the arithmetic is straightforward enough, studies such
as Pajares and Miller (1994) have noted that many adults dislike and avoid math, even those who
are competent at calculation. Ashcraft (2002) observes effects of math anxiety even on simple
whole-number arithmetic problems. It has been argued that math anxiety could shape individuals’
behavior when facing challenging circumstances (Bandura, 1977).
The design of the card choice task requires participants to carry out, on demand, a mathematical
calculation in the context of a novel setting not previously encountered. Prepayment may be an
effective tactic when the task to determine the earnings-maximizing choice requires an activity the
decision-maker is disinclined to carry out. At the end of the session, after all choices were made but
before the results of the decisions were shown, participants completed a screen of demographics
questions, asking for the participant’s gender, current course of study, and whether they were a
native speaker of English. In addition, we included the question,, “Do you consider yourself good
at mathematics?” This was implemented as a radio box, with options for Yes, No, or “Prefer
not to say” as the possible responses. Such self-reports of mathematical skill have been used as
a behavioral indicator in economics and psychology (e.g. Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001; Ashcraft and
Ridley, 2005; Marsh et al., 2012; Buser et al., 2014).6
6We prefer the participant’s self-reported confidence level rather than their actual mathematical ability. We placed
no time restrictions or pressures on the individual decisions, and we are confident our students are capable, in principle
at least, of carrying out the required calculations correctly. Our hypothesis instead centers around the possibility that
some participants feel less attracted or inclined to engage with the required computational task.
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Hypothesis 5. Participants who report confidence in their ability to carry out mathematical cal-
culations will have higher maximization rates in prepayment treatments.
3 Results
We report on 206 participants who participated in the task. Within our sample, the breakdown
of males (44.2%) and females7 is comparable to our participant pool and the University’s student
body as a whole. Less-experienced participants had participated, on average, in 1.78 previous
sessions, while the very-experienced participants had been in 15.67 previous sessions on average.
A total of 106 (51.5%) considered themselves good at mathematics, with 86 (41.7%) saying they
were not; 14 preferred not to say.
We conducted Fisher’s exact test for independence between each pair out of the four demo-
graphic characteristics of math-confidence, prior experience, gender, and native English speaking.8
The only pair for which the null hypothesis of independence is rejected at the 10% level is between
gender and math-confidence: 61.5% of males (56 in total) answered this question in the affirmative,
as opposed to 43.9% of females (50 in total); the difference is significant with a p-value of 0.008.
Previous studies (Eccles, 1998; Buser et al., 2014) have also observed greater reported confidence
in mathematics among males than females.
The results in HAA focus on the rate of maximization by participants in the two “low-spades”
trials, in which a spade card is present but is not the earnings-maximizing choice. We report
this measure for each treatment in Table 2, where we also present breakouts of the low-spade
maximization rate overall for each characteristic. The rightmost three columns in Table 2 give
the percentages of participants who maximize on none, one, or both of the low-spades trials.9
In general, the modal outcome for a participant is to maximize on both low-spades trials, with
maximizing on exactly one of the two being more likely than failing to maximize on either.
We will base our tests principally on the distributions of the maximization counts by participant.
For this our workhorse will be the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test. In addition to p-values,
we report an effect size for each instance of the MWW test. Given two groups with sample sizes n1
and n2, respectively, and a MWW test statistic value U , the effect size is given by r = U/(n1n2).
This is the estimate of Pr(x2 > x1) + 12Pr(x2 = x1), where xi is a randomly drawn individual
from group i = 1, 2.
We look at the relationship between individual characteristics of our participants and their rates
7One participant declined to disclose their gender.
8Because our participants are drawn from across the student body and therefore a wide range of degree courses,
we omit degree course here. We do look subsequently at the performance of students of economics, of whom there
are few and are approximately equally scattered across the treatments.
9A more detailed summary of distributions of choices broken down by each of the seven sets is in Appendix A.
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Maximizing
Subsample Group N All 0/2 1/2 2/2
HAA results Post 61 95.1 0.0 9.8 90.2
HAA results Pre+Amt 50 66.0 20.0 28.0 52.0
Treatment Post 49 79.6 10.2 20.4 69.4
Treatment Pre+Amt 54 60.2 22.2 35.2 42.6
Treatment Post+Amt 49 73.5 10.2 32.7 57.1
Treatment Pre+Amt+Instr 54 70.4 18.5 22.2 59.3
Prior experience 0 to 5 sessions 112 70.1 16.1 27.7 56.3
Prior experience 10 or more sessions 94 71.3 14.9 27.7 57.5
Math-confident No 86 59.3 22.1 37.2 40.7
Math-confident Yes 106 78.8 12.2 17.9 69.8
Math-confident Decline to say 14 78.6 0.0 42.9 57.1
Gender Female 114 66.2 19.3 29.0 51.8
Gender Male 91 76.4 11.0 25.3 63.8
Native English speaker No 73 66.4 19.2 28.8 52.1
Native English speaker Yes 130 74.2 12.3 26.9 60.8
Degree course Not economics 179 67.6 16.8 31.3 52.0
Degree course Economics 25 90.0 8.0 4.0 88.0
Table 2: Low-spade maximization rates, disaggregated by treatments and demographic character-
istics. The first two rows report the comparable results from HAA. Not all demographics breakouts
of our data add up to N = 206 due to blank responses.
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Gender = Female Gender = Male
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 24 70.8 16.7 25.0 58.3 22 88.6 4.6 13.6 81.8 .377 .077
Pre+Amt 21 42.9 38.1 38.1 23.8 26 69.2 15.3 30.8 53.9 .321 .025
Post+Amt 26 73.1 11.5 30.8 57.7 20 75.0 10.0 30.0 60.0 .487 .860
Pre+Amt+Instr 33 68.1 18.2 27.3 54.6 18 80.6 11.1 16.7 72.2 .412 .235
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .047
(a) By gender
Native English speaker = No Native English speaker = Yes
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 16 81.3 6.3 25.0 68.8 30 78.3 13.3 16.7 70.0 .495 .943
Pre+Amt 16 62.5 25.0 25.0 50.0 31 54.8 25.8 38.7 35.5 .444 .502
Post+Amt 13 53.8 23.1 46.2 30.8 33 81.8 6.1 24.2 69.7 .709 .013
Pre+Amt+Instr 21 61.9 28.6 19.1 52.3 30 80.0 12.9 26.6 60.5 .603 .153
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .083
(b) By native English speaker
Table 3: Low-spade maximization rates by treatment, for characteristics without prior hypotheses.
All reports overall maximization rate; k/2 the proportion of participants who maximized on k of
the low spades trials, k = 0, 1, 2. r and p report the effect size and p-value, respectively, of the
MWW test for equality of distribution across the characteristic, for the given treatment. The Fisher
combined probability method is used to report a p-value for the joint null hypothesis of no effect
due to characteristics across all treatments.
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of maximization on low-spades trials. We break out the low-spades maximization data by charac-
teristic and by treatment in Table 3 for characteristics on which we did not make a priori hypotheses
(gender and native language), and in Table 4 for those on which we did make hypotheses (experi-
ence and mathematics self-confidence). Each characteristic divides our sample into two groups.10
To look for evidence of an overall effect on maximization rates due to the characteristic, for each
treatment we compare the distribution of low-spades maximization rates between the groups using
MWW. Because each treatment is an independent sample, the four tests by treatment are inde-
pendent tests. We aggregate the p-values of the individual tests for the four treatments using the
combined probability method of Fisher (1925).
Overall, unconditional on treatment, males (76.4%) maximized more often than females (66.2%).
Table 3a shows that males have a higher maximization rate in all treatments. The overall test for
a gender effect is significant at the 5% level (p = .047).11 Participants who are native speakers of
English (74.2%) maximized more often than those who are not (66.4%). Table 3b shows a less uni-
form pattern across treatments. Non-native speakers are much less likely to maximize than native
speakers in Post+Amt and Pre+Amt+Instr. The overall test for an effect due to native English
speaking is significant at the 10% level (p = .083).
We observe (with admitted pleasure) that students on economics courses choose the earnings
maximizing card more often (90.0%) than those on other courses (67.6%).12 Among economics
students, 18 (72.0%) identified as being good at mathematics, and 3 (12.0%) declined to say, while
among students from other schools, 86 (48.0%) said they were good at mathematics, and 11 (6.2%)
declined to say. These distributions are significantly different (p = .009 using Fisher’s exact test
for independence). A variety of approaches have been used in the literature as to whether to
include, exclude, or control for the presence of economics students in experimental samples, often
depending on the research question to hand. Friesen and Earl (2015) found that students with
economics training perform better in tasks involving choices with multipart tariffs. In the UK
university system, students do not in general take courses on other subjects, and so we can say
that non-economics students in our sample would be unlikely to have much undergraduate-level
training in economic reasoning. Nevertheless, we cannot distinguish whether the effect would
be due to selection of students into the economics program, or whether training in the type of
economic models that motivate experiments in economics makes students more likely to recognize
and choose the earnings-maximizing card. As the economics students are small in number and
spread uniformly across the four treatments, we omit this characteristic in further analysis.
We now look at the characteristics on which we set hypotheses. Participants with 10 or more
10In what follows, we omit the participants who did not respond to one or more of the demographics questions.
11We note that all sessions were led by the same female experimenter.
12We omit the breakout table due to the low numbers of economics students. Carrying out the same procedure as
above results in a p-value of .103 for the combined probability test of no effect due to course of study.
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Prior experience 2 [0, 5] Prior experience   10
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 24 79.2 16.7 8.3 75.0 22 79.5 4.6 31.9 63.6 .468 .644
Pre+Amt 23 56.5 23.1 34.8 39.1 24 58.3 25.0 33.3 41.7 .513 .874
Post+Amt 27 70.4 14.8 29.6 55.6 19 78.9 5.3 31.6 63.1 .554 .484
Pre+Amt+Instr 29 74.1 10.3 31.0 58.6 22 70.5 22.7 13.6 63.6 .503 .965
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .953
(a) By prior experience
Math-confident = No Math-confident = Yes
Maximizing Maximizing
Treatment N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 N All 0/2 1/2 2/2 r p
Post 18 69.4 11.1 38.9 50.0 28 85.7 10.7 7.1 82.1 .356 .044
Pre+Amt 17 55.9 23.5 41.2 35.3 30 58.3 26.7 30.0 43.3 .479 .804
Post+Amt 18 63.9 16.7 38.9 44.4 28 80.4 7.1 25.0 67.9 .376 .109
Pre+Amt+Instr 31 56.5 25.8 35.5 38.7 20 97.5 0.0 5.0 95.0 .212 .0001
Fisher combined probability test of equality of distribution for all treatments .0002
(b) By math-confidence
Table 4: Low-spade maximization rates by treatment, for characteristics with prior hypotheses.
All reports overall maximization rate; k/2 the proportion of participants who maximized on k of
the low spades trials, k = 0, 1, 2. r and p report the effect size and p-value, respectively, of the
MWW test for equality of distribution across the characteristic, for the given treatment. The Fisher
combined probability method is used to report a p-value for the joint null hypothesis of no effect
due to characteristics across all treatments.
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sessions of experience maximized on 71.3% of trials overall, compared to 70.1% among those with
5 or fewer sessions. Table 4a shows that the two groups have similar maximization rates for each
treatment; the overall combined probability test returns a p-value of .953, indicating no evidence
of any systematic effect.
The maximization rate for those reporting they were good at math is 78.8%, compared to
59.3% for those saying they were not. A total of 14 participants declined to answer this question.
Their overall maximization rate is 78.6%, suggesting they are more similar to those answering the
question yes than those answering no; we drop these 14 from the analyses below. Table 4b shows
that the math-confident participants maximize much more often in three of the four treatments,
with the notable exception being Pre+Amt. The overall combined probability test results in a
p-value of .0002, indicating strong evidence that the answer to this question predicts low-spade
maximization behavior.
We begin the statement of the formal results following from our hypothesis by evaluating our
replication of HAA’s results in our overall participant pool.
Result 1 We replicate HAA’s result that the maximization rate on low-spades trials is lower in
Pre+Amt than in Post. The maximization rate in Pre+Amt is comparable in our data and HAA,
but we observe a significantly lower maximization rate in Post. The magnitude of the treatment
effect is therefore smaller in our data overall.
Support. As we do not have demographics breakouts for HAA’s participants, we test Hypothesis
1 using aggregate data for all participants irrespective of demographics. Table 2 reports an overall
low-spades maximization rate of 79.6% in Post, which decreases to 60.2% in Pre+Amt. We reject
the null hypothesis that the distributions of maximization rates are the same in both treatments
(MWW, r = .639, p = .0069).
The overall maximization rates on low-spades trials in Pre+Amt are similar in our data (60.2%)
and HAA (66.0%); the distributions are not statistically different (MWW, r = .543, p = .41). Our
results differ significantly in Post, where HAA report a 95.1% maximization rate as opposed to
our 79.6% (MWW, r = .609, p = .0042).
As shown above, there are patterns in maximization rates when participants are broken out in
groups by individual characteristics. We can therefore do a more detailed analysis of our data for
Post and Pre+Amt, as summarized in Table 5a. For each group we test the null hypothesis that the
maximization rate is the same in Post and Pre+Amt, which generates the effect size r and p-value
reported in the Table. The two tests on the groups generated by a characteristic are independent;
for each characteristic we aggregate the results of the two tests using Fisher’s method. Using this
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approach, we find the evidence for Result 1 is robust to breaking out the data by each of the four
characteristics.
Result 2 The mere mention of the total value of spades does not significantly affect behavior in
postpayment conditions. The largest effect size is observed among non-native speakers of English,
who maximize less often when the total value of spades is mentioned than when it is not.
Support. Overall we observe a low-spade maximization rate of 73.5% in treatment Post+Amt
as opposed to the 79.6% rate observed in Post. These overall rates are not statistically different
(MWW, r = .555, p = .27). Table 5b reports on the results of this comparison applied to each
group generated by individual characteristics, in which we see that no treatment difference is estab-
lished when looking across any of the characteristics. The largest effect size, and smallest p-value,
is found among non-native speakers of English (r = .704, p = .039); this group’s maximization
rate drops from 81.3% in Post to 53.8% in Post+Amt, whereas native English speakers do not
show a similar pattern. This p-value is not small enough to obtain significance at the 10% level,
using the Holm-Bonferroni method to account for the multiple tests.
Result 3 The alternate instructions rephrasing the link between each set and payment lead to
higher maximization rates, comparable to the baseline postpayment treatment.
Support. Overall, the low-spade maximization rate in Pre+Amt+Instr is 70.4%, which is be-
tween the 79.6% observed in Post and 60.2% in Pre+Amt. However, in Table 4b we note that in
Pre+Amt+Instr a majority of participants did not consider themselves good at math, which is the
opposite pattern from the other three treatments. The results of tests controlling for each individual
characteristic are shown in Table 5c for Pre+Amt versus Pre+Amt+Instr, and Table 5d for Post
versus Pre+Amt+Instr. The null hypothesis of no difference in distribution is not rejected for any
of the tests between Post and Pre+Amt+Instr. On the other hand, the null hypothesis is strongly
rejected when controlling for math-confidence when comparing Pre+Amt and Pre+Amt+Instr
(p = .0020), as well as rejected at 5% when controlling for gender (p = .038) and 10% when
controlling for native English speaking (p = .051).
Our formulation of Hypothesis 2 specifically related to the mention of spades under the post-
payment condition only, and Hypothesis 3 the effects of rephrasing instructions under prepayment.
All treatments other than Post involved a mention of the total value of spades in the instructions.
Ex post, we observe in Table 3b that the maximization rate for non-native speakers is more than
20 percentage points lower across these three treatments in which the total value of spades is men-
tioned, compared to Post. While Pre+Amt+Instr results in an increase in maximization for native
English speakers compared to Pre+Amt, a similar effect is not evident among non-native speakers.
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Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .643 .041 Female .688 .021 .0069
Native English speaker Yes .668 .013 No .617 .198 .018
Math-confident Yes .688 .0046 No .596 .292 .011
Experience   10 sessions .642 .069 0-5 sessions .661 .033 .016
(a) Post versus Pre+Amt
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .609 .127 Female .492 .913 .365
Native English speaker Yes .490 .871 No .704 .039 .150
Math-confident Yes .561 .304 No .539 .665 .525
Experience   10 sessions .504 .963 0-5 sessions .579 .256 .592
(b) Post versus Post+Amt
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .412 .259 Female .329 .025 .038
Native English speaker Yes .323 .0090 No .500 1.000 .051
Math-confident Yes .235 .0002 No .494 .945 .0020
Experience   10 sessions .411 .257 0-5 sessions .380 .107 .126
(c) Pre+Amt versus Pre+Amt+Instr
Characteristic Group r p Group r p Combined
Gender Male .552 .444 Female .519 .786 .717
Native English speaker Yes .504 .942 No .612 .191 .489
Math-confident Yes .433 .172 No .587 .279 .194
Experience   10 sessions .533 .660 0-5 sessions .560 .370 .589
(d) Post versus Pre+Amt+Instr
Table 5: Summary of tests comparing low-spade maximization rates across treatments. MWW is
used for the individual test of each group. Effect sizes r are reported such that r > .5 corresponds
to a higher rate in the treatment listed first. Combined gives the p-value of obtained by aggregating
the results of the MWW tests for the corresponding groups using Fisher’s combined probability
test.
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We now look more specifically at the two individual characteristics on which we had set prior
hypotheses.
Result 4 We do not find any evidence that participants who have participated in 10 or more
previous sessions are more or less likely to maximize earnings than those who have been in 1 to 5
sessions previously.
Support. Table 4a presents MWW tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in maximizing
rates between the two experience groups. The null hypothesis is not rejected for any treatment;
p-values are uniformly high and effect sizes are uniformly close to .5, corresponding to no effect.
Of the four individual characteristics considered, breakouts by experience show the least between-
group variation within each treatment, as well as the least evidence for any differential treatment
effects.
Result 5 Reported mathematics confidence overall is a strong predictor of the likelihood to
choose earnings-maximizing cards in low-spades trials. However, the treatment difference in Post
versus Pre+Amt+Instr is accounted for mainly by its effect among participants who identify as
being good at math.
Support. Table 4b presents MWW tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in maximizing
rates. Overall, there is evidence of a strong effect correlating to the answer to this question (p =
.0002). The effect is not uniform across treatments. In Post, those identifying as good at math
maximize significantly more often, by an 85.7% to 69.4% margin; the MWW test shows this
difference is significant (r = .356, p = .044). Likewise there is a difference between the groups
in Pre+Amt+Instr, with math-confident participants maximizing on 97.5% of trials and others on
56.5% (MWW r = .212, p = .0001). However, in Pre+Amt the performance of the two groups
is not distinguished; math-confident participants maximize on 58.3% of trials and others on 55.9%
(MWW r = .479, p = .804).
The positive correlation overall between math-confidence and performance on the task is intu-
itive, although it is interesting that it comes through so strongly on a task which might not seem that
demanding at first look. More surprising is the result that it is math-confident participants whose
maximization rates lower most sharply in Pre+Amt. When we look only at math-confident par-
ticipants, the size of our treatment effect between Post and Pre+Amt is comparable to the results
reported by HAA. We observe a drop in maximization rate from 85.7% to 58.3% in this group, and
HAA report a drop from 95.1% to 66.0%. HAA conducted their experiments at Duke University, a
private institution that is one of the most selective in the United States. Our replication was done at
a middle-tier public university in the United Kingdom, which is best known for its degree programs
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in areas such as literature and creative writing, and which offers no engineering or physics courses
at all. It is plausible that our participants who identify as math-confident are more comparable to
the sample at Duke; if that is the case, our results provide a firm replication of HAA’s effect.
Our results seem rule out an account in which the treatment effect between Post and Pre+Amt
occurs due to less-numerate participants making more frequent calculation errors in Pre+Amt.
Such a hypothesis would be supported by a larger drop in the maximization rate of participants
with less math-confidence; we find exactly the opposite. The lack of a large treatment effect among
less math-confident participants may arise because of the extra noise due to a higher error rate
in the arithmetic calculations required; the higher baseline maximization rate of math-confident
participants in Post makes it easier to pick up a treatment effect.
Although math-confident participants may not be making arithmetic errors, they may still be
making errors in judgment in Pre+Amt due to other factors.13 If this is the case, then alternative
phrasings like those in Pre+Amt+Instrmay have the effect of debiasing the decision-maker. These
effects have been explored in psychology (e.g. Evans et al., 1994), law (e.g. Babcock et al., 1997),
and accounting (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2002) as well as economics (e.g. List, 2001). In the case
of the instructions used in Treatment Pre+Amt+Instr, explicitly stepping through the process by
which payments will be realized might influence whatever processes participants use to come to
their decisions.
4 Conclusion
HAA reported a striking result: in a simple choice task with no objective risk, participants were
less likely to choose earnings-maximizing cards when they received a prepayment based on some
other, non-earnings-maximizing choice. We have shown this effect is qualitatively robust, even
with a different participant pool and somewhat higher incentives.
Given the apparently straightforward calculations required to maximize earnings in this deci-
sion task, it is remarkable that undergraduate students both at Duke (HAA) and University of East
Anglia (this paper) would, overall, leave money on the table. We therefore take a closer look at
this decision task, both to map out the extent to which maximization rates depend on details of the
experimental protocol, and to understand better whether certain subgroups of participants are less
likely to maximize earnings.
We find that the effect of prepayment does depend on the description of the experimental task.
The methodological observation that participant decisions are not independent of instructions is
13For the purposes of this paper, we put to one side the question of normative implications. If a decision-maker is
truly loss-averse, then choosing the non-earnings-maximizing card might be viewed as optimal from the perspective
of their preferences. McQuillin and Sugden (2012) provide one survey of the issues in reconciling behavioral and
normative economics.
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hardly novel, but the potential practical implications are noteworthy. We can think of the descrip-
tion of the experimental task as the analog of the description of offers to consumers or terms and
conditions of agency contracts. One interpretation of HAA’s results and our replication is that it
is easy to influence decisions, even when there is no objective risk and the choice architecture is
not very complex. HAA’s instructions, used in the Pre+Amt treatment, while brief, are not overtly
misleading. Our Pre+Amt+Instr instructions are somewhat more explicit, which may serve a
debiasing function. A regulator whose objective was to keep people from making apparently sub-
optimal decisions might find descriptions similar to ours preferable because of their debiasing
effects. However, creating effective written communication is challenging.14 Because instructions
like HAA’s are not overtly misleading, and because the effect of written communication on an
audience is difficult to judge, even by experienced writers, the regulator might find it difficult to
distinguish between well-intentioned but unclear writing, as opposed to deliberate obfuscation.
This simple choice task devised by HAA generates an interesting amount of variation in per-
formance, depending on how it is presented, and on the characteristics of the decision-makers. The
task is sufficiently stylized that broad claims about external validity should be tempered. However,
the stark simplicity of the setting helps to illustrate some possible subtle mechanisms firms could
use to influence the behavior of agents or consumers, with corresponding implications for the prob-
lems that market designers or regulators face in evaluating the appropriateness of the structure of
contracts or offers.
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A Choice distributions at the set level
In this appendix we provide a more detailed view on the seven sets of cards faced by the partic-
ipants. In each table, the first row shows the four cards that were used in the set. The next row
contains the values of the cards; the data for the card(s) which maximize earnings are displayed in
bold. The total number of choices and corresponding frequencies for each card are presented for
each treatment, Post, Post+Amt, Pre+Amt, and Pre+Amt+Instr, in separate rows, recalling that
Post and Pre+Amt are replications of HAA.
Set 1 Q~ 4| 6} 6~
Value GBP 1.20 GBP 0.40 GBP 0.60 GBP 0.60
Post 94% 46 4% 2 2% 1 0% 0
Post+Amt 88% 43 8% 4 2% 1 2% 1
Pre+Amt 96% 52 4% 2 0% 0 0% 0
Pre+Amt+Instr 87% 47 6% 3 7% 4 0% 0
Set 2 2~ 3} 5 3~
Value GBP 0.20 GBP 0.30 GBP 1.25 GBP 0.30
Post 0% 0 0% 0 100% 49 0% 0
Post+Amt 0% 0 6% 3 94% 46 0% 0
Pre+Amt 0% 0 2% 1 98% 53 0% 0
Pre+Amt+Instr 0% 0 7% 4 93% 50 0% 0
Set 3 J} 4 7~ 9~
Value GBP 1.10 GBP 1.00 GBP 0.70 GBP 0.90
Post 73% 36 27% 13 0% 0 0% 0
Post+Amt 71% 35 29% 14 0% 0 0% 0
Pre+Amt 54% 29 46% 25 0% 0 0% 0
Pre+Amt+Instr 65% 35 30% 16 2% 1 4% 2
Set 4 J| K} 7} 6|
Value GBP 1.10 GBP 1.30 GBP 0.70 GBP 0.60
Post 2% 1 98% 48 0% 0 0% 0
Post+Amt 6% 3 92% 45 0% 0 2% 1
Pre+Amt 2% 1 96% 52 0% 0 2% 1
Pre+Amt+Instr 2% 1 96% 52 2% 1 0% 0
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Set 5 4~ 10} A 8~
Value GBP 0.40 GBP 1.00 GBP 0.25 GBP 0.80
Post 0% 0 86% 42 14% 7 0% 0
Post+Amt 0% 0 76% 37 22% 11 2% 1
Pre+Amt 0% 0 67% 36 31% 17 2% 1
Pre+Amt+Instr 0% 0 76% 41 20% 11 4% 2
Set 6 3 2| A} 4}
Value GBP 0.75 GBP 0.20 GBP 0.10 GBP 0.40
Post 86% 42 0% 0 4% 2 10% 5
Post+Amt 67% 33 0% 0 12% 6 20% 10
Pre+Amt 87% 47 2% 1 0% 0 11% 6
Pre+Amt+Instr 80% 43 2% 1 6% 3 13% 7
Set 7 5} 2} 3| 2
Value GBP 0.50 GBP 0.20 GBP 0.30 GBP 0.50
Post 53% 26 0% 0 2% 1 45% 22
Post+Amt 41% 20 0% 0 0% 0 59% 29
Pre+Amt 7% 4 0% 0 0% 0 93% 50
Pre+Amt+Instr 15% 8 0% 0 0% 0 85% 46
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1 Comparison of instructions
In this appendix, we provide the full text of the instructions for each of the four treatments. In
addition, we provide the instructions as used by Hochman et al. (2014) for comparison.
1.1 Treatment Post
1.1.1 This paper
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions and
make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your
earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.
We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instructions as
they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times.
Each time, you will select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have selected.
Each card is worth its point value times 10p, so a three is worth three times 10p, a nine is worth
nine times 10p, et cetera. Aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times 10p, queens are worth
twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades () are worth their
point value times 25p, not 10p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is worth two
times 25p, and so on.
At the end of the game, we will pay you for the cards you have selected.
1.1.2 HAA
Thank you for your participation. Feel free to ask questions at any time if anything is unclear.
There are no tricks or catches to this game, we simply ask that you pay attention to the instructions
and think carefully about your decisions. You will be paid some amount of money at the end of
the game; how much you are paid will be determined by the decisions you make.
You will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times. Each time, you will select
and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have selected.
Each card is worth its point value in dimes, so a three is worth three dimes, a nine is worth nine
dimes, et cetera. Aces are worth one dime, jacks are worth eleven dimes, queens are worth twelve,
and kings are worth thirteen.
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However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades are worth their point
value in quarters, not dimes. The ace of spades is worth one quarter, the two of spades is worth
two quarters, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly.
At the end of the game, we will pay you for the cards you have selected.
1.2 Treatment Post+Amt
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions and
make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your
earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.
We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instructions as
they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times.
Each time, you will select and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have selected.
Each card is worth its point value times 10p, so a three is worth three times 10p, a nine is worth
nine times 10p, et cetera. Aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times 10p, queens are worth
twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades () are worth their
point value times 25p, not 10p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is worth two
times 25p, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly.
The value of the five spades, ace through five, equals a total of three pounds and seventy-five pence:
one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p i.e. three pounds and seventy-five
pence.
At the end of the game, we will pay you for the cards you have selected.
1.3 Treatment Pre+Amt
1.3.1 This paper
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions and
make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your
earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.
We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instructions as
they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times.
Each time, you will select and keep one card.
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After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have selected.
Each card is worth its point value times 10p, so a three is worth three times 10p, a nine is worth
nine times 10p, et cetera. Aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times 10p, queens are worth
twelve times 10p, and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades () are worth their
point value times 25p, not 10p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is worth two
times 25p, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly.
The value of the five spades (ace through five) equals a total of three pounds and seventy-
five pence: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p i.e. three pounds and
seventy-five pence. We will give you this amount up front.
However, if you do not choose all of the five spade cards, you will need to give us back some
of this money at the end of the game. The amount you return will be the value of the spade card(s)
that you did NOT choose.
For example, if you do not pick up the three of spades, you will return three times 25p to us
from your three pounds and seventy-five pence.
At the end of the game, if you have not selected all spades, we will pay you for the cards you
have selected, and you will refund us money for the spades you have not selected.
1.3.2 HAA
Thank you for your participation. Feel free to ask questions at any time if anything is unclear.
There are no tricks or catches to this game, we simply ask that you pay attention to the instructions
and think carefully about your decisions. You will be paid some amount of money at the end of
the game; how much you are paid will be determined by the decisions you make.
You will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times. Each time, you will select
and keep one card.
After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have selected.
Each card is worth its point value in dimes, so a three is worth three dimes, a nine is worth nine
dimes, et cetera. Aces are worth one dime, jacks are worth eleven dimes, queens are worth twelve,
and kings are worth thirteen.
However, those values apply only to cards that are NOT spades. Spades are worth their point
value in quarters, not dimes. The ace of spades is worth one quarter, the two of spades is worth
two quarters, and so on. We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly.
The value of the five spades (ace through five) equals a total of three dollars and seventy-five
cents: one plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen quarters i.e. three dollars and seventy
five cents. We will give you these fifteen quarters up front.
However, if you do not choose all of the five spade cards, you will need to give us back some
of this money at the end of the game. The amount you return will be the value of the spade card(s)
that you did NOT choose.
For example, if you do not pick up the three of spades, you will return three quarters to us from
your three dollars and seventy-five cents.
At the end of the game, if you have not select all spades, we will pay you for the cards you
have selected, and you will refund us money for the spades you have not selected.
3
1.4 Treatment Pre+Amt+Instr
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow the instructions and
make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your
earnings for today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.
We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow along with these instructions as
they are read aloud.
On your computer monitor, you will be given sets of four playing cards, face-up, several times.
No card will appear more than one time during the experiment. Each time, you will select and
keep one card. After all of these sets are completed, you will be paid based on the cards you have
selected.
The value of a card to you depends on the card’s suit and point value. Spades () are worth
their point value times 25p. The ace of spades is worth 25p, the two of spades is worth two times
25p, and so on.
We have placed the cards ace through five of spades in the deck randomly. The values of these
five spades (ace through five) equal a total of three pounds and seventy-five pence, because one
plus two plus three plus four plus five is fifteen times 25p is three pounds and seventy-five pence.
We will give you this amount up front.
Cards of the other suits, hearts (~), diamonds (}), and clubs (|), are worth their point value
times 10p. So, a three is worth three times 10p, a nine is worth nine times 10p, et cetera. In these
suits, aces are worth 10p, jacks are worth eleven times 10p, queens are worth twelve times 10p,
and kings are worth thirteen times 10p.
At the end of the experiment, you will leave the lab with a total payment equal to the sum of the
values of the cards you select. For each set of four playing cards, there are three possible scenarios:
• There is not a spade among the four cards. Then, at the end of the session, you will receive
a payment for that set equal to the value of the card you select.
• There is a spade among the four cards, but you select a different card. Then, at the end of
the session, you will pay us back from your up front payment an amount equal to the value
of the spade, and you will receive a payment from us equal to the value of the card you did
select. For example, if you did not select three of spades but instead select four of diamonds;
we will pay you 40p corresponding to the four of diamonds and you need to refund us 3
times 25p corresponding to the three of spades.
• There is a spade among the four cards, and you select the spade. Then, because you have
already received payment for that spade card in your up front payment, you will not pay us
back anything for that set, nor will you receive any additional payment for that set.
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2 Screenshots of participant interface
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